Das Spätdenken Martin Heideggers und die zwischenmenschliche Problematik
(Martin Heidegger’s Late Thinking and the Interpersonal Problem)
Abstract.- In his late philosophy Heidegger does not treat the problem of intersubjectivity, known as „being with“, in the same explicitness as it was familiar to him in his early writings. The question is: Why? What are the possible philosophical reasons on Heidegger’s side leading to such conceptual changes? This is the issue the present paper tryes to investigate. Heidegger’s not only academical but also political experience that the modern subjectivity – meaning the fundamental structure of the ontological constitution – is not to be identified with human ego, because surviving also in all social forms of human being, such as nation, race, society or globally organised civilisation, is one of the reasons for the late Heidegger to not consider automatically the „being with“ as a sign of a nonsubjective conception of human being. The second source of this development is the particular conceptual importance of the „thing“ – as not being only a passively subjected to its own constitution, but playing an active role in this context – in relation to which the human being as such, including his intersubjectivity, becomes „only“ a partner, that means only one of the relevant participants on the constitution of the reality and its meaning.